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Abstract 
 
This paper attempts to problematise morality and to locate and investigate morality as an 
everyday activity.  The paper draws extensively on the work of Zygmunt Bauman on the 
Holocaust and the challenges the Holocaust makes to social theory and to ethics.  
Following Bauman and Giddens, I argue that morality is pre-social and forms part of the 
social world in which we live and that it cannot and should not be codified.  Some 
implications for future research on the morality of the everyday are made. 
 
Keywords morality, ethics, every day life 
 
 
 
Over a number of years I have had to provide a course on ethics as part of the professional 
development for Information Systems students studying in a Business Faculty.  I have often felt 
uneasy about the courses that I had developed and almost all of the business and computer ethics 
books I had read.  Would the students following my course be aware of, let alone take a moral 
course of action in their working lives?  Would they recognise, even dimly, the key issues facing 
their world and would they take a moral stand and what would that stand be? 
 
Their essays and examinations on ethics and professional or global issues of computers and 
information systems showed that almost all could identify a breach of a professional code of 
ethics reasonably easily, most could tell the difference between consequentialism and the 
deontological ethics with a bit of an effort and some could even apply such concepts to the 
textbook and exam ethical dilemmas thrown to them with moderate skill and occasional passion.  
However, my concern was whether my students would pass the moral test of history.  My unease 
began to be articulated when I read Dillard (2003) on IBM and the Holocaust.  What struck me 
most of all was that not only did it seem plausible that IBM, its managers and professionals may 
have been implicated in the holocaust in some way, but that my teaching and the textbooks would 
in all likelihood not prevent my students – decent and law abiding that they appeared to be — 
making similar choices to those that IBM professionals allegedly had done.  Even worse in all 
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likelihood it would not have prevented them from doing what most German professionals did 
during the Holocaust when they buried themselves in the technical and managerial problems that 
their superiors lawfully handed them (Bauman, 1989). 
 
My ongoing questions are: how do we as teachers prepare our students against such things and 
how do we as researchers theorise, identify and explore how such things may happen in the 
business world?  Indeed, how are not only immoral acts created but also how is goodness 
possible?  Finally, do we aid in the prevention of evil and wrong doing and how do aid and abet 
the good?  My background is in sociology so it is perhaps not surprising that I approach these 
questions from the point of view of a sociologist.  Morality is an empirical issue and my task 
therefore is to see how and when goodness is created and how and when evil occurs.  I leave what 
morality is as an open question, what is good and what is evil is derived inductively and 
hermeneutically, such a question is best answered at the end of the journey rather than at the 
beginning.  This paper is very much at the start of the journey at the stage of preparation and 
puzzle.   
 
 
Bauman’s Challenge to the Sociology 
 
Zygmunt Bauman (1989; 1994) provides an important critique of morality and sociology.  He 
argues that sociology, and by extension I believe, business ethics research, has not adequately 
recast our sociology of morality in the light of the horrors of the Holocaust.  Bauman’s key 
observation of the Holocaust was that Nazi society distorted, twisted, corrupted the ordinary 
everyday decency of people and how through such distortions people supported and served 
bureaucratically planned and organised technologies of death (Bauman, 1989). 
 
Germany, but more importantly, modernity, failed the test, as the Final Solution “arose out of a 
genuinely rational concern, and it was generated by bureaucracy true to its form and purpose” 
(Bauman, 1989; 17 emphasis original).  Bureaucracy – instrumental reason, met with “another 
invention of modernity”: “a bold design of a better, more reasonable and rational order” 
(Bauman, 1989: 106) and basic morality and humanity were systematically addressed, and 
destroyed.   
 
With this insight he virtually turns our understanding of morality on its head – both secular 
philosophy and sociology and also its theological predecessors.  He argues rather than society 
producing morality, it is society that distorts morality: 
 
The substance of morality being a duty toward the other (as distinct form an obligation), and a 
duty which precedes all interestedness — the roots of morality reach well beneath societal 
arrangements, like structures of domination or culture.  Societal processes start when the structure 
of morality (tantamount to intersubjectivity) is already there.  Morality is not a product of society.  
Morality is something society manipulates — exploits, re-directs, jams (Bauman, 1989; 183 
emphasis in original) 
 
Bauman is directly challenging our ‘etiological myth’ that it is the norms, moral sanctions and 
laws of our society that prevents human life from being “poor, nasty, brutish, and short” as 
Hobbes once put it.  Bauman argues that through the work of Durkheim such a view has been 
embedded within sociology – that societal norms and sanctions produce morality.  However, like 
Bauman I find that post Holocaust, the Killing Fields of Cambodia and in a time of Weapons of 
Mass Destruction, of environmental degradation and of political dissembling, lies and spin, it is 
hard to hold credulity to the view that it is society that makes us moral. 
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For the sociologist it poses an initial theoretical question as to how can it be that something 
apparently as social as morality not be a product of society?  It also poses the more practical 
issues of how does society, and how and where do institutions undertake the manipulation, the 
exploitation, redirection and jamming?  It opens up the question of not how do we teach morals, 
but how do we protect or equip people from being mislead, how is the routine and everyday 
coopted into evil and the immoral?  The task at hand is to investigate how the practices of 
socialization “consist in the manipulation of moral capacity” (Bauman, 1989: 178). 
 
The implications of Bauman’s insight for business and industrial ethics is how business and work 
as institutions ‘exploit, redirect and jam’ the moral sensibilities of the stakeholders of business 
ranging from worker, manager and owner, to governments and unions and the community ‘at 
large’.  We must look to how and whether decent law abiding people can do evil things in their 
daily work without registering that their acts are even remotely immoral, how the decisions they 
make or ignore affect the well being of others and how the morality of such decision-making is 
apparently excluded from the well being of others.  This I believe is the post-Holocaust, 
postmodern challenge to the ethics business and work ethics. 
 
 
Morality as ‘pre-societal’ 
 
For Bauman, what morality is and what it means, cannot be universalised into moral codes 
without contradiction.  It is aporetic, an insoluble problem.  It is partial and ‘unreasonable’, 
unamenable to reason.  This certainly reflects my struggle with what morality is – that it is 
something that refuses and cannot be caged by reason.  It is a phenomenon rather than a dictate or 
rational set of rules to be followed.  As a phenomenon it has in common with all the other 
sociological concepts such as self, gender, race and power that are contradictory and contextually 
based.  The focus is not on ‘straightening out’ morality but of following its trajectory, describing 
its emergence and disappearance.   
 
Morality, Bauman argues does not perform a social function nor is it society that calls morality 
into being.  Morality for Bauman not only precedes society but also the self.  Bauman (1994: 13) 
argues that there is ‘no self before the moral self’ and to think otherwise is to ‘assume tacitly that 
moral responsibility is a mystery contrary to reason, that selves would not be ‘normally’ moral if 
not for some special and powerful cause; to become moral, selves have to first give up or curtail 
some other constituent of themselves…’ (1994: 13).  Morality, the practices that constitute how 
one does and should behave, and selfhood are intertwined.  As Levinas (1991), cited by Bauman 
describes “ethics does not supplement a preceding existential base; the very node of the 
subjective is knotted in ethics”.  Bauman, following Levinas understands this ethics forming the 
structure of subjectivity. 
 
Bauman’s theory has been called ‘non-sociological’ (eg Junge, 2001; Davydova and Sharrock, 
2003) as a consequence of his insistence that morality precedes both society and self.  Bauman is, 
I believe, following a general postmodern approach to social ontology where neither society nor 
the self is ontologically prior (Schatzki, 1996).  Within this approach, social practices or 
discourses, the doings and sayings of people precede both society and the self.  It is through these 
practices that both the self and society are constituted and exist within those practices.  Morality, 
in my view, is a social practice that is not dictated by society but as with all social practices 
produces society.  We need to consider the social practices that constitute morality in the same 
way as we consider those practices that constitute the self or gender (cf Butler, 1990).  Similarly, 
as Bauman recognises, morality forms part of the constitutional processes of the self.  It is part of 
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the subjective knot and structure of the self, possibly similar in the way that gender forms part of 
the structure of self. 
 
To be clear, Bauman does not appear to make the claim of postmodernist appreciation of social 
practices that I have presented.  However, it is clear that it is the presumed externality of morality, 
its secondary or derivative and calculable status that Bauman saves for most criticism.  He 
wishes: 
 
To imply, in other words, that the moral tendency, that is concern for the Other for 
the Others sake, has the character of a pre-reflexive inner compulsion.  It is also to 
imply that if not for extraneous forces (which include the learned and interiorized 
tendency to the rational calculation of gains and losses, the assessment of adequacy 
with an abstract rule etc.), the self self-determination of moral agents would 
invariably express itself in such a concern. It is to imply, finally that if concern with 
the Other does not appear, or if its effectivity is defused and brought to naught, an 
operation of extraneous forces and there resulting heteronomy of the agent is to be 
supposed. 
 
Bauman speaks of a ‘moral impulse’ that is born in the intersubjective relation with another.  This 
is not I believe a call to a hereditary disposition but to an ontogenetic development that emerges 
out of intersubjectivity just as our self-identity and our gender also emerge and are incited in 
intersubjectivity.  The moral impulse is as unavoidable as gender or self-identity. 
 
It is in this sense then that morality is pre-societal, but not pre-social.  It is therefore in the social 
practices that we engage in that we must look to find morality and to investigate how society can 
indeed distort that morality and how it may accentuate some aspects of everyday morality that 
given the aporetic and contradictory nature of morality such amplification may lead to its 
opposite – immorality.   
 
 
Morality and self, norms and intelligibility 
 
For practice theory, the self emerges or is incited and produced within social practice and the 
continuous ongoing nature of the world (Giddens, 1991).  Social reality, including the self and 
society is not a given where the self is like an actor on an existing stage but both the self and 
social reality is constructed, existing as an instantiation.  We make our social world in a 
continuous flow of conduct and ‘lived through experience’ (Giddens, 1976: 73).  The self and our 
social worlds are ongoing social accomplishments, having no independent existence outside our 
enactment of them.   
 
The self is socially produced as an engagement in the practices of the world that discipline, train, 
incite or call forth its ongoing production (Schatzki, 1996).  Rose (1991) refers to this process as 
subjectification.  This subjectification produces both difference and sameness of the self to others.  
It is different in that small differences lead to large differences.  For example, the small 
differences between human males and females are disciplined in such a manner to create at times 
large differences in attitude and character.  There is a sameness, although no essence as one 
gender shares some similar experience.  Such ‘discipline’ or training must be distinguished from 
theories of passive or deterministic socialisation.  The disciplines produce or call forth the active, 
reflective self (eg Foucault, 1986).   
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The self is created, constituted at that moment and exists only in its enactment, its reflexivity.  As 
Giddens recognises, such a constitution cannot be ‘wholly fictive but must integrate events in the 
external world and sort them into an ongoing story of the self’ (Giddens, 1991: 54). To this end, it 
is an accomplishment, an achievement.  It is something that is done well or ill with more or less 
meaning, coherence and longitudinal integrity to oneself and to others.  Morality forms part of 
this accomplishment. 
 
Morality in this sense of the term, may well, as Bauman suggests forms part of the structure of 
social reality.  How this occurs and how it shapes social interaction and society in different ways 
needs to be further developed.  Cahill (1986) provides an insight into how gender is used by 
children to create a selfhood which may prove analogous to the development of moral 
responsibility.  Cahill shows that young children wish to distinguish themselves as both 
competent and different from babies.  By using gender appropriately the young child 
demonstrates competency as a girl or boy.  In a similar way, if morality is considered a set of 
complex social practices, demonstrating the ‘right’ response also demonstrates competency and 
responsibility.  The child gradually increases their engagement with others through these social 
practices of gender.  The key word here, I believe is that of responsibility – the child learns to be 
responsible to the other and for their actions and by doing so grows and takes on further 
responsibilities.  
 
Morality so conceived is not a monolithic code, but a set of multiple, complex and contradictory 
practices.  Morality is, as Bauman suggests ‘prior to’ ontology.  It is prior in the sense that 
through the operation of trust and moral responsibility that our social ontology is created and can 
be created.  It is, as Bauman argues “the primary structure of intersubjective relation in its most 
pristine form, unaffected by any non-moral factors (like interest, calculation of benefit, rational 
search for optimal solutions, or surrender to coercion)” (Bauman, 1989: 183). 
 
A socially constructed world is nevertheless quite orderly and consistent.  I have described how 
the self is made consistent but how is the world fixed between people.  We must look carefully at 
how social interactions are made consistent and how inconsistencies are ironed out as 
misunderstandings, incompetence, or as naïveté.  Following the work of Garfinkel, norms provide 
the reference points or grids out of the plethora of possibility and possible interpretations in order 
to produce a contingently agreed social (intersubjective) reality and human actors within that 
reality from which to proceed (Coulter, 1989).  Norms, according to practice theory approaches 
are not regulatory or determinative but are ‘standardised expectancies’ that people ‘discover, 
create and sustain’ (Heritage, 1984: 109).They provide the reference grid or benchmark to joint 
action and constitute the material of daily life.   
 
Such standardised expectancies are both moral and ontological in character.  As expectancies, 
they are moral in that they suggest what each person ‘should do’ in given circumstances.  
Deviations from standardised expectancies draws attention to something going on: 
 
Normative accountability is the ‘grid’ by reference to which whatever is done will 
become visible and assessable.  And, subject to this condition of visible 
accountability, conduct undertaken for whatever objectives will tend to become 
designed and shaped responsively to the constraints imposed by this visibility.  In 
this sense, normative accountability can best be viewed as organizing, channelling 
and, in a sense, ‘domesticating’ the ways in which interests may be realized 
(Heritage, 1984: 117). 
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Moreover there is a moral expectation that all actors will ‘play by the rules’ and jointly create an 
intersubjective and social world.  As Garfinkel (1967) discovered in his breach of trust 
experiments, moral sanctions were applied not for deviations from norms per se but for the breach 
of trust.  Morality is entwined in the fixing or fastening of the world and self and other in that 
world.  Bauman’s ‘concern for the other’, I suggest is found here in the concern for being 
responsible for the establishment of trust. 
 
Finally, there are important psychological implications of the world being socially constructed. 
Giddens (1991) argues that, not only do we live in a social world that is continuously and 
contingently produced, but that we also have some knowledge of this.  Consequently there is an 
existential fear that its collapse may not be not far away.  Giddens (1984; 1991) points out that we 
have considerable emotional investment in ensuring a consistent and stable world.  As he states: 
 
The orderliness of day-to-day life is a miraculous occurrence, but it is not one that 
stems from any sort of outside intervention; it is brought about as a continuous 
achievement on the part of everyday actors in an entirely routine way.  That 
orderliness is solid and constant; yet the slightest glance of one person towards 
another, inflexion of the voice, changing facial expression or gestures of the body my 
threaten it.  (Giddens, 1991; 52) 
 
People speak of the unreality of sudden events such as accidents or events where the world seems 
to ‘turn upside’ down and where people recounting what occurred may differ substantially.  
Outside of the sustained world lies an existential abyss.  Such an abyss is staved off by creating a 
stable framework for ontological security or protective cocoon around the self.  The world is 
made safe and consistent and chaos is held at bay.  We thus have the prospect of a neuroticism of 
the individual failing to look out of the immediate situation and take a deeper or larger view of 
the situation.  Is it the case the Arendt, referring to Eichmann and the banality and small 
mindedness of evil is actually referring to neuroticism, the production of a neurotic security? 
 
Morality being put to sleep 
 
For Bauman it is factors external to this moral/ontological concern that distort, misdirect and 
avoid this moral capacity. In some way calculative interest, ideological bias and indifference 
corrupts such moral concern viewing the other not as a point of engagement with another but 
variously as an enemy, a resource, a self-interested ally.   
 
He argues that codes and norms1 ‘put to sleep’ the conscious.  This too is a challenging viewpoint 
of Bauman’s and rests on an ongoing moral struggle or moral deliberation with the Other, with 
the here and now.  Ethical codes take away the moral responsibility of the moral agent.  As 
Bauman (1998: 16, emphasis original) argues “Codes and norms are not the beginning, but the 
end of moral relationship; and more often than not, the moral self”. 
 
Bauman’s challenge is for ethics researchers and theorists to identify how such institutions such 
as business, work and modernity distort this moral impulse, how trust and concern are tuned into 
fear and loathing, blind indifference and self interest.  How people appear impotent in the face of 
ethic problems.  How, our moral conscious is put to sleep and how it might actually be awoken. 
 
                                                 
1 By norms, I believe he is referring to Durkheim or Parsons notion of norm as a regulatory force. 
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Giddens provides I believe two important approaches.  The first being the establishment of an 
ontological security that normalises experience.  The second is that of the sequestration of 
experience.  Giddens argues that the orientation of modernity towards control removes moral 
questions or unsettling events out of the control and experience of the individual.  Such 
sequestration does remove ethical responsibility from the agent.  The ethics are ‘taken care of’ by 
experts, others hidden.  The individual is not ‘qualified’, it is another’s problem to deal with.  
This is what Bauman means by being ‘put to sleep’.  In classes as I work through ethical 
questions in classes, I sometimes wonder that what I am really teaching the students is that they 
are patently not qualified given the complexities of the problems and their dissatisfaction and 
obvious limitations in addressing the issues and given that there is no ‘right’ answer ‘any answer’ 
will suffice, at least for now. 
 
Bauman (1989) speaks of the notion of ‘floating responsibility’ whereby nobody, or at the very 
least somebody quite distant is responsible for the moral decision.  He summarises the ‘sphere of 
the management of morality” as follows: 
 
Social production of distance, which either annuls or weakens the pressure of moral 
responsibility; substitution of technical for moral responsibility, which effectively 
conceals the moral significance of the action; and the technology of segregation and 
separation, which promotes indifference to the plight of the Other which otherwise 
would be subject to moral evaluation and morally motivated response. 
 
 
The way forward 
 
This paper is simply a beginning and a very small beginning at that.  However, the 
problematisation of morality vis-à-vis society is a first step, a step that takes us past much 
business ethics texts, codes and principles.  We need to focus our research on how ethics are lived 
and avoided and how and whether society does indeed twist and distort ethical issues.  We need 
to develop a research project on the morality of the everyday.  
 
Such a research project can draw on the work of those who have considered the atrocities of the 
Holocaust on the role of ordinary people and professionals in the carrying out of those atrocities.  
In a similar manner we should look at ethical (mal) practices not to identify the rules that were 
not followed, or to develop new codes but to see how the actors themselves rationalised to 
themselves and to others their activities.  We must also identify how ethical issues are taken away 
from – sequestered from the worker such that ethical issues are dealt with and answered by some 
other department whose expertise is seen to be beyond that of the worker.  By (re)locating 
morality in the everyday we may better prepare ourselves and our students for the moral issues 
and dilemmas that we will face. 
 
How this may be achieved as a research project is, I believe, to follow the field study approaches 
of the sociology of science where the laboratory findings are made.  Our task would be rather to 
see how ethical matters by workers and managers are discussed and avoided.  The study of how 
nuclear scientists and professionals rationalised and discussed the weapons of mass destruction 
that they were producing provides as similar approach (cf. Broad, 1985; Cohn 1987). 
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